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ABSTRACT: One of the most disturbing problems of social decision making and indeed quite difficult to resolve is the 
need to reconcile individual rationality with that of society. While individual rationalizing rules indicate 
ways to maximize benefits without any restriction, the collective point of view tilts toward the limitation of 
individual maximization. This is the very core of the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma which is but a formal 
way of saying that there is good reason for every individual to defect on a bargain; the ‘good reason’, that 
generally takes the gentler form of a self-exception, is that if a player defects and his opponent does not, 
then the former profits. The purpose of this study is to show the highly erosive character of this self-
exceptions and also to make evident its perverse normative power. 
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1 Introduction 
From the point of view of the utilitarism it is generally accepted that any transgression 
to the norms has a cost which should be assumed by the offenders. In the sphere of 
so-called private actions who produces a damage to other, should compensate him re-
imbursing the value equivalent at the cost derived from the offence. In the sphere of 
the so called public actions a new element appears: it is the social cost that the viola-
tion of certain norms brings about. In these cases, it is considered that the cost of the 
violation is not paid enough for the mere compensation; additionally it is necessary to 
adding the cost of the social disturbance associated to the violation. 
 In the case of the crimes, especially of those that are particularly repugnant to the 
collective sensibility, a high value is usually assigned to the social cost taking into ac-
count the erosive character that such actions have on the collective tissue, and the im-
pact that they have on the credibility of the social relationships. The defence of the 
special sphere threatened by this type of crimes, is considered as an important social 
objective, and any lesion that it suffers is weighed and added at the individual cost of 
the transgression.  
 However, there is a certain type of transgressions that do not demand the same at-
titude when the social costs are evaluated. They are the so called self exceptions that 
are small offences, seemingly innocent (the violation of the order of priority in a 
queue, the brief parking in a forbidden place, the small deceit in the tax form), they 
however have a great normative power and also an immense capacity for eroding the 
public trust. In a general way the self exceptions individually considered do not show a 
dramatic profile and many times they could be presented as totally innocuous; how-
ever, many of the problems of social cohesion that affect to the contemporary society 
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are not but a transformation (not linear) of the innocent self exceptions. On the one 
hand they are able to diminish the efficiency of the community, by mean of the reduc-
tion in quantity and quality of the public resources; on the other hand, they also have a 
normative power (counter normativity) that makes them responsible for relatively im-
portant social costs that are not always considered in their exact weight.  
 When a member of the society violates a norm, a complex collective engagement is 
set in motion in order to restore the things to the previous balance; in order to achieve 
this goal the sanctions are used as a tool, to punish offenders in a degree that is di-
rectly proportional to the gravity of the violation. There are some cases of violation of 
the norms that specially grieve the society and are considered as true collective trage-
dies; among these the merciless murders, the acts of cruelty on people, or the acts of 
flagrant violation of the human condition are counted. Under these circumstances, it 
seemed that social answer tends to be deeper and more active, as such infringements 
constitute an authentic threat to the viability of the group. The authors of such viola-
tions, except for a few exceptions, also tend to accept the character of their behaviour; 
even when they manage to minimize the amount of the sanction by pleading attenuat-
ing circumstances or even when proffering a justificatory explanations, the idea that 
the social coexistence has been affected, in general is always present. This feeling is 
also shared by the rest society, even when this does not always mean assuming dis-
criminatory attitudes or the drastic isolation of the offender.  
 There are other kinds of defiant behaviours which do not entail such a dramatic 
profile, and therefore do not constitute any superlative danger for collective existence 
but are also considered as disturbing the collective welfare. Although this category do 
not receive the same feeling of repulsion as in the previous case, such conducts are 
condemned without hesitation not only from the legal point of view but also at the 
social level; in this group are the violations that affect the property and the peaceful 
use of the goods. As in the previous case, the fact than an actor has committed a fault 
and continues to do so does not mean that he is unconscious of the distance between 
his conduct and the accepted normative marks of reference. 
 On the contrary, with the so-called self exceptions something particularly curious 
occurs. Generally, these are ‘small’ exceptions that, just like water flowing through 
rocks gets filtered in an overlapping manner, succeeds in percolating through the very 
basic soil foundation. In these cases, the actor is not only way apart from the legal or 
social order; he even dares to justify his attitude and to lend it legitimacy. He is almost 
proposing a new framework of legitimacy and consequently a new mark of normative 
reference. The most surprising aspect of these cases is that self-exception has a great 
power of seduction, and even those who do not practice it are inclined toward not 
openly condemning it, ending up tolerating it tacitly. In a general way this is due to the 
fact that we tend to underestimate the factor highly erosive that the self exceptions in-
troduce in the collective relationships and its great normative power. This power 
mainly produces its negative effect on the use of common or public spaces and goods, 
and is able to undermine the collective trust. As these behaviours can affect the effi-
ciency of the norms and institutions the consideration of the point has an important 
significance in the processes of legislation and design of public decision making. The 
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purpose of this paper is to show the highly erosive consequences for collective rela-
tions where self-exception tendencies are exhibited. Furthermore, the article tries to 
shed light on the great normative power which the insensible and unwitting consolida-
tion of dis-social conducts may have on collective interests. 
 As for introduction of the topic we use a parable referred to loads established to 
make possible a collective space, it should be remarked that self exceptions take on 
many different forms that go from behaviours of omission (not to assume the socially 
established loads as contribution to the community), to active behaviours (to trans-
gress prohibitions that protect the collective goods). In spite of the great variety of 
forms these behaviours cause similar effects on the social tissue and also share a 
common structure. 
2. A brief history of disillusion 
The village is beautiful. It harmoniously lies in a protected and shady valley. Grace-
fully, sunny mountains shelter it, with its slopes having deep marks of nature’s work 
wrought through several centuries. Vines grow while smoke can be seen ascending 
from some solid stone houses. The orchards always remain green. As for the villagers, 
they go through a blissful cycle of dreams of watering, pruning, harvests and musts. 
 The very old still remember how it was long ago the village patron saint’s day. It 
was a feeling of what seemed like an admixture of pagan exhilaration with innocence 
and rustic merriment that lead everybody to the village square: men and women, old 
and young and children, all in their most adorned country dresses. They all live to-
gether in this unusual, but genuine serenity of rural life, devoid of ill feelings. From 
early in the morning, the square is meticulously cleaned; its pavement which has seen 
centuries shining in deep-wet grey. Like treasure hunters, children reverently and si-
lently take it upon them to ensure that not a leaf or stick remain littered, and an-
nounce with joy the discovery of any. Several men and women are in charge of gar-
lands. Women are engaged in trying to keep the multi-coloured papers for the gar-
lands in the proper chromatic sequence without entangling them in the ropes that 
support them. They must handle them carefully. The men have their tasks on top of 
ladders, completing the supports, pillars, checking the quality of knots and other struc-
tures. Men and women exchange suggestions, orders and advice and the echoes of 
laughter often beam through the air; at times with the risk of a twist at the top of the 
ladder. Doors and windows of the housing surrounding the square are converted into 
objects of decorative delight. Garlands and braided paper compete with other items 
that offer a silhouette, along with bells, balloons and fruit hung around. When the 
tasks are finished participants leave the scene proudly, animatedly, turning back occa-
sionally to look at the effect of their work on the square from different angles. 
 By mid-afternoon, one or two carts arrive carrying a big empty barrel and several 
booths. A number of young people, undoubtedly more than are required, also arrive 
and begin to set up the container right in the centre of the square, on a support which 
has been provided. With a feeling of fulfilment and indeed pride, they make sure that 
the big wooden cork adjusts correctly and whether the faucets open and close prop-
erly. Booths are set up appropriately. Once the young people finish their tasks, they 
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drive away in their carts, leaving in the afternoon the stele of their rather noisy cele-
bration. 
 In a formal sense, the festivities start at the end of the day, although the prepara-
tions go on through-out the day. From near and far, families start to arrive, always fol-
lowing the same ritual. The women display trays with the sweet aroma of food in the 
booths, removing the immaculately white linen cloth spread over them. Examining 
the result with critical eyes, they put in last minute aesthetic touches. Meanwhile, the 
men from the various families go to the barrel, uncover it and ceremoniously begin to 
pour in several litres of their best wine contained in various vessels. 
 During the next hours, excitement grows fast, especially propelled and stimulated 
by the good food, good drink, sweet talks and songs. Above all, every participant feels 
a deep contentment that it was worth the while to have been together, sharing culinary 
secrets treasured by neighbouring families. They especially delight tasting in the air 
and the palate the marvel provided by the seemingly magic mix of the best the sun, 
the vineyards and the wine press can produce. Moreover, coming as it did all at once 
after the toil and hard labour of an entire year. They also feel satisfied that it made 
sense to have worked assiduously and contributed time, effort and goods in preparing 
for the celebrations, because the occasion repaid in multiples of dividends. It also 
helps them cherish the fact that nothing can be done well without the help of others: 
neither the cleaning nor the decoration or the making of the booths. Similarly, neither 
the process of preparing the food, nor the barrel nor the wine can match the spirit of 
the celebration. Very late at night, tired, but happy, the villagers return to their homes 
deeply enlivened and in some sense also in melancholy over the end of the event. 
 As the time passes, it becomes obvious that the village’s festivity, though in a kind 
of parenthesis, constitutes a medium for putting away strife and grudges. It also serves 
as an escape valve through which several symbolic tensions within society are defused, 
as well as an excellent setting for re-enacting bonds of friendship and love.1 
 Nobody recalls exactly how it happened, nor when everything started. Neither 
does anyone remember who was the first, but then something happened. Perhaps it 
was the villager who nursed a slight resentment because by his estimation his efforts 
toward the preparation of the party were not valued commensurately by others; in an-
other sense, it could have been the work of someone who was once quite famous and 
well admired for his efficiency and sense of rationality in the management of re-
sources; still yet, it could have been somebody who being ill had lost the pleasure of 
good wine; or yet still the machinations of a widow who for some time had lost the 
pleasure of the attention and good company of others; there is also the possibility of 
tracing it to someone who had resolved to leave the village and move to a different lo-
cation.2 Regardless of who it was and when it started, the fact of interest was that 
                                                   
1 As promoters of the festivity in the village, social relations take the form of a full-pledged cooperative 
game. For formalized treatments of game theory, see, e. g., Luce/Raiffa 1957, Harsanyi 1977, Bin-
more 1994, 1998. 
2 This illustrates the most common reasons which lead social agents to abandon cooperative behavior: 
(A) They believe that the collective deal is not egalitarian. (B) They regard individual rationality as un-
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someone, somewhere in time began to introduce sub-standard wine. Believing that 
this conduct would never be discovered in a barrel full of the excellent wine from oth-
ers, year after year, this continued. As it would seem, the practice began to percolate 
among the people and with time assumed a more generalized dimension. Until one 
day, as the faucet was opened, it became apparent that what streamed out was virtually 
mere water. 
 Today, some people still remember that unfortunate night, and their perplexity is 
mixed with despair, disappointment and nervousness. But as expected, from the mo-
ment events turned sour, a number of explanations were tendered; each one at vari-
ance with others. Those ‘others’ being responsible for the failure of everybody’s party 
and thereby became black-spotted as enemies. The Village Festivity was over! 
 The ill-fated night when the rueful discovery occurred was naturally followed by a 
deep unhappiness. Imputations, pointed finger and denials were made towards an-
other. What’s more, the village nearly became totally denigrated to a parley for the set-
tlement of strife, enmity and open hostilities between individuals. Older people 
charged on younger ones, young ones accused the old for the state of affairs, etc. 
Some on their part talked continuously about old injustices which served to justify al-
ready unjustifiable situations and reasoning. Some people even maintained that the 
best thing to do was to leave everything as it already was. This meant that everyone 
should drink his own wine and arrange ways to have his own fun. But curiously, in 
spite of these developments, it was evident and undeniable that each and every one 
had a part to blame, although among each group of ‘talkers’, justifiable reasons for 
self-exoneration from the fraud could be heard. However, it was obvious from the 
fact of the continual sessions of ‘talking’ about the events, even if only for the sake of 
reciprocal recrimination, that there existed a strong will to turn back the road that led 
them to this rueful situation, even though for every one it was ‘the other’ who was 
primarily responsible for the undesirable state of affairs. Who knows, probably the 
first person was already dead or a long time ago had moved to live somewhere far 
away from the village. Probably he was living in a better village and drinking good 
wine. 
3 Everybody enjoys good wine 
The episode which occurred in the village happens quite frequently in the course of 
social interaction. Such behaviour patterns that end up in the very undesirable results 
we have seen also exist in our daily lives. Think, for instance, of the hurrying lady who 
parks her car ‘just for a second’ in front of a hydrant, convinced that she is not caus-
ing damage to anybody. Not too dissimilar is the gentleman who cuts down a tree – 
after all, “never mind, it is too old” – in order to create new space on the sidewalk to 
accommodate a new family car. No better still is the charming girl, smiling towards a 
queue of people waiting to be attended and asking for permission to make “a short 
enquiry” which ends up as a complex consultation that itself requires a “quick proce-
                                                                                                                                 
constrained in the realization of its own possibilities. (C) The profit on terms does not fulfill their ex-
pectations. (D) The scenario of the game is no longer interesting and will thus be changed. 
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dure”.3 All these varieties of attitudes have certain common elements. On the one 
hand, certain individuals exhibit the desire to receive benefits through “a small excep-
tion to the rule”. On the other hand, such an exception is deemed so small that it will 
not harm a world order in which all others are respectful. The person so exempted 
sincerely does not believe that he is inflicting a grievous injury on anyone else. The 
beneficiary of the exemption always has justificatory reasons to explain and justify his 
demeanour not only to himself but often even to others. 
 The consequences of these behavioural patterns are felt at two levels. On the one 
hand, such people make nothing to improve social efficiency. On the other hand, they 
create an environment for reciprocal misgivings that usually weakens the consistency 
of collective interests. Each of these consequences creates avenues through which 
special kinds of problems arise that, in turn, dictate specific approaches to a solution. 
 As it pertains to the first kind of problem, it is more or less evident that self-
excepting behaviour on the part of the members of a society always carries some im-
mediate consequences, mostly in the form of the diminution of the scope and quality 
of public welfare, as in the case of the village’s wine, or the impossibility of access to 
the hydrant at a time of emergency, or more still, the precarious impact of deforesta-
tion on a suburban setting. In all these instances, the collective will in its entirety and 
at the level of its constituent parts was sacrificed. This produces discomfort and disaf-
fection. Some people maintain that flexibility for the sake of “small exceptions and 
transgressions” contributes to make such inconveniences more bearable. This goes on 
without noticing that the origin of these ones are found in other “ small exceptions” 
before them. 
 The solution to these kind of problems, at first sight, seems more or less simple. It 
is conceivable that behaviour tending to harm collective resources should be punished 
with hard sanctions in order to reduce their occurrence to the bearest minimum. But 
to successfully attain this objective, sanctions need to satisfy two conditions. First of 
all, they must be severe enough to constitute a loss that surpasses the benefits eventu-
ally derivable from the ‘small exception or default’. Second, the probability that such 
sanctions are consistently and effectively applied to all defaulters must be high. 
With 
e case in which some individual uses a ‘small exception default’ 
U(e) utility derived by that individual in case e 
S legal sanctions for case e 
D(s) disutility produced by the established sanction for case e 
P(s) probability of the effective application of the established sanction for case e 
 
the following relationship must hold: 
U(e) < P(s) . D(s) (I) 
 
                                                   
3 Such situations constitute the background to the well-known Prisoners’ Dilemma. I have extensively 
analyzed it in Barragán 1989. 
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 When a social group establishes sanctions in which a strong or hard punishment is 
foreseen for people using ‘small exceptions or defaults’, but the actual probability of 
the effective application of such sanctions is very low, the relationship indicated above 
will not be satisfied. This relation makes it evident that procedures which tend to-
wards the application of norms are as important as the amount of the sanction. 
 Social practices may generate two kinds of deferring answers when confronting 
small exceptions or defaults. While some groups generally refuse to accept them and 
under certain circumstances may become excessively rigid and insensible, others tend 
to be extremely flexible, so exceptions become ‘rules’ with rather severe consequences 
for the long term social fabric. Societies in which the first kind of answer is prevalent 
usually offer an environment that can be easily foreseen. Where adequate measures are 
taken in order to avoid these small exceptions, people will rely on them. In groups 
where the social language is based on the second kind of answer, the probability of 
forecasting is very low and unexpected problems can surface at any moment. The so-
lution to such problems would also tend to be unstable. Of course, it is only in groups 
which assume the first kind of social practice that the basic relationships make it pos-
sible to solve problems arising from small exceptions and defaults. 
 In spite of the apparent simplicity of the relationships already treated, to put them 
into practice presupposes a number of difficulties which seem significant. In our ex-
ample. villagers prove this when some time after the unfortunate night people are 
calm enough to think of a possible way out. After long and complicated discussions, a 
plethora of ideas are pondered and the villagers eventually agree that the origin of the 
problem was the lack of control in the quality of individual contributions. In order to 
correct this deficiency, they agree on establishing a random verification of the wine by 
three tasters. Of course, they must be the best experts in the area, and have the re-
sponsibility to accept or refuse the wine before it is poured into the barrel. At random, 
three out of ten contributors are thus tested. In cases where there is a rejection, in ad-
dition to the social reproof that generates, sanctions are imposed on the culprits who 
obviously wanted to defraud the common interest and obtain undue advantages. 
 Then the first problem that arises is the standards for electing tasters with the best 
senses for smelling and tasting. Since it is assumed that such experts must be very 
good, their superiority vis-à-vis other eligible candidates can only be based on rather 
vague criteria. By and large, three names are eventually elected by the majority. 
 In spite of its ostensible simplicity, the task is hard to accomplish. The attribute of 
being excellent tasters does not mean that they are completely inflexible, intolerant 
and of impeccable sentiments. Besides, they have a good level of information about 
the generality of village life. They are therefore challenged with the task of rejecting 
wine of inferior quality, imposing sanctions on, say, a good peer who has just gone 
through a year of difficulties. How can they reject, for instance, a new neighbour’s 
wine, when he has come to the festival full of spirit and expectancy, or even for the 
first time?... But then the cases multiply, and the criteria how to handle such condi-
tions, and people begin to speak quite loudly about discriminations and favouritism. 
The way out is thought to be guardians, or putting checks on the tasters and making 
them responsible for their decisions. New sets of sanctions are then established, this 
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time for the tasters who may be found to have compromised the honourable dis-
charge of their duties. All these measures, on the short run, contribute to the im-
provement of the quality of the wine, as compared with the unfortunate night when 
things turned sour. Yet still, the village festival cannot recover the lost spirit of a col-
lective and cooperative enterprise. Some people are, no doubt, in a good mood, but 
others largely act under the coercive threat of sanctions threatening them. In pouring 
good wine, they feel obliged to comply and not motivated by the wish to share in 
communal gaiety. Thus, they try not to go the extra mile in overdoing their generosity. 
Many of them are skeptical whether some neighbour may not have been less pious 
and thereby obtained a personal advantage. There is also the suspicion that, say, 
friendship or family relations with the tasters may bias the random selection of fami-
lies for wine verification. 
 From what happens in our ficticious village, it could be inferred that to keep rela-
tion (I) as impartially effective as possible in a collectively desirable sense, it is essential 
to put in place the force and sanction that is applicable and appropriate. This supposes 
a continuous task of monitoring all aspects that have the tendency of being vulnerable. 
On the other hand, it is clear that even if such measures make the intention of fraud 
against public welfare almost unprofitable, they can at best deliver a higher quantity 
and quality of public benefit, but they can not assure, nor promote the standards of 
cooperative behaviour among group members. As will be explained in greater details 
below, this in itself constitutes another set of problems. 
4 Good wine alone is not enough 
By itself, the system of sanctions is incapable of promoting cooperation in a social en-
vironment, because relations generated under this framework are evaluated exclusively 
by computing profits and losses. In such a context, it is natural that individuals con-
tribute wine with the minimum quality; just good enough to take the hurdle of being 
tasted. Nor does it seem strange that some people, psychologically speaking, even take 
the risk of contributing wine of a very bad quality, hoping that it will escape the scru-
tiny of the tasters. For instance, it will not be surprising if someone deliberately con-
tributes wine of poor quality in the belief that his charm, charisma, prestige or even 
age may make the umpires consider any likely incrimination as a ‘small exception’. As 
explained above, it is natural for this to happen because any of such behavioural para-
digms increases individual utility4 
 It must be noted here that the solution based on the appropriate application of the 
system of sanctions besides promoting specific collective interests also has the poten-
tial of making evident a real general interest for stimulating behaviour based on mu-
tual trust. From this point of view, sanctions, besides discouraging fraudulent behav-
                                                   
4 Several authors, such as Harsanyi, maintain that cooperation is promoted only through a modification, 
by means of punishments, of the profit/loss system of the players. It turns out, however, that pun-
ishments alone are not a sufficient warrant for the inviolability of agreements when the calculus of 
the potential disutility versus the potential utility of punishments provides reasons for agreements to 
be violated. On this, cf., e. g., C. S. Nino 1991. 
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iour through the calculation of benefits and losses as expressed in (I), make public a 
normative message in favour of long-run profits that are able to promote a construc-
tive and stable way of life. But such a message lacks the necessary autonomy and 
specificity to restore by itself the language lost in our village. 
 The villagers in our story feel that recuperating the quality of the wine constitutes 
an important goal and that to its attainment the system of sanctions has contributed a 
lot, but at the same time they perceive that its essential objective is deeper and consists 
in restoring the language that has almost been lost. That language had been possible in 
its moment, starting from some basic rules, such as respecting acquired engagements, 
mutual trust, and equity in treating individual group members. 
 The dissatisfaction among the villagers, in spite of a great improvement in the 
quality of the wine, makes it clearly evident that two kinds of problems are always 
generated when individual interests are maximized at the expense of collective inter-
ests. First, there is a reduction in the quantity and quality of public services which at 
the same time has a corollary effect in the overall efficiency of all social action. On the 
other hand, as already mentioned, such patterns of behaviour at first create within the 
collectivity a feeling of frustration, but afterwards such defiant conduct is incorporated 
insensibly into the repertoir of accepted norms of the whole. They end up constituting 
their own social language. From the example of our ficticious village, which we have 
amply considered, it may be deduced that solving the first problem does not mean a 
palliation for the second one. 
 As a matter of fact, a solution founded on the development of an articulated sys-
tem of sanctions only pays marginal attention to the latter problem. No doubt it at-
tacks the first problem with a high degree of efficiency. However, its worth is ex-
tremely weak and indeed not directed at a steady solution to the more fundamental 
problem of recasting a new social language. For this reason, it is unlikely that a long 
term improvement in the quantity and quality of public welfare may be achieved 
merely by resorting to a system of controls backed by sanctions. From the individual 
point of view, there are always people who are disposed to overrun controls and sanc-
tions, with the expectation of getting additional benefits5. On the contrary, it is highly 
probable that such consequences as experimented in our village from the time of that 
unfortunate night will occur repeatedly, despite the watchful eyes of the tasters. As is 
well-known. because of the vulnerability implied by the inherent imperfection of hu-
man beings and human systems, controls can always be mocked and sanctions cleverly 
evaded. The construction of a language of cooperation is a much harder and slower 
task than establishing a system of control accompanied by the corresponding sanc-
tions. But clearly the language of cooperation is the only reward mechanism capable 
of reinforcing the stability of relation (I). As a consequence, the language of coopera-
                                                   
5 It must be noted that the probability of diminishing the effects of a sanction is relatively high, especially 
if the procedural warranties accepted in most Western countries are taken into account. To compen-
sate for this probability, a given sanction would have to be endowed with such great power that only 
a few people would justify its application. This would also be a source of harmful consequences for 
those who are at a disadvantage in using procedural resources. 
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tion is also the only viable mediating condition to maintain the quality and efficiency 
of social welfare in the long term. 
 The language of social cooperation, just like any other language, should not be 
constructed as a simple medium or vehicle for expressing reality or ideas which are in-
dependent of proper communication. Rather, it should be seen as a constructive and 
advisory element of what has been expressed. From this perspective, it is not neces-
sary to wait for the existence of a previous and concisely developed society founded 
on the basis of social cooperation to apply the language of cooperation. Instead, the 
formation and conscious application of such a language of cooperation will contribute 
in a parallel manner to the construction of the social basis of cooperation. 
 To propel the construction process of such a language, all that is needed is a pri-
mary element common to all human beings and human society – the existence of ex-
pectation. In fact, if there is something always present in men even in their lowest 
evolutionary stages it is their ability to foresee the possible occurrence of certain 
events. Even in cases where man is far from being able to formalize this, he is always 
capable of constructing a vision of possible situations and of estimating their likeli-
hood. Both the images and the evolution of language are intrinsically related to the 
system of expectations and to the transformation to which it is subjected during the 
processes of development. 
 Together with expectation, language is modified through interaction and exchange 
and gradually incorporates diverse elements that have been at the origin of communi-
cation itself. In their dynamic features, language and communication are not just me-
dia of expression, but factors inducing the transformation of various processes. Ex-
change serves to activate the understanding of existing problems, to stimulate the con-
struction of new problems and to generate modifications in shared systems of expec-
tation6 
In the case of our village, it is not strange, therefore, that after the unfortunate 
night, in this particular manner collective expectations are directed at the search for a 
platform on which the problem can be solved. Since everybody remembers that many 
years ago, before the disagreeable experience, the taste of the wine drunk during the 
festival was good, it is not surprising that interactions and exchanges revolve around 
that issue. And interactions then produce a transformation in expectations. The villag-
ers not only hope that a good wine can be consumed at the festival, they also reacti-
vate the expectation of making the village a place of joy during the day of its patron 
saint. 
5 The language of cooperation 
The language of cooperation that seems to have existed at some time in our village 
and which is also associated with the fresh expectation of attaining more worth than 
just a good wine, at first is characterized by the existence of a collective disposition of 
the members. This is rooted in their desire to use joint strategies to solve common 
problems, considering that such measures can make individual efforts more useful for 
                                                   
6 See Whitney 1989 and Hattiangadi 1987. 
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public welfare than if applied in isolation. In the second place, members of the collec-
tivity expect from the use of such joint strategies the accruement of individual utilities 
which can be considered equitable, in line with one’s contributions and, of course, 
needs. Finally, they recognize that the deployment of joint strategies means working 
towards the attainment of the highest benefits they can all contribute to, but also re-
signing some individual utility, since part of these benefits may be kept in the public 
wealth. In other words, the expectation of obtaining maximum dividends at the indi-
vidual level is expressed within the context of the language of cooperation with the 
expectation of reaping maximum benefits for the social collectivity and, of course, 
reasonable and equitable individual benefits. 
All this sounds extremely attractive, but the older villagers certainly have the ex-
perience that such expectations are not completely new. On the contrary, they have 
existed for many years even when the festival was a collective enterprise and the wine 
was excellent. That shows that the existence of expectations alone is not a sufficient 
guarantee that the language of cooperation is incorporated once and for ever into a 
system of communication that is accepted by all members of the group7. 
 Up to this point, to continue further in the search of ‘something more than a good 
wine’ it would not only be useful, but necessary to take an inventory of some of the 
factors which conspire against the expectation of considering the festival a desirable 
collective enterprise. After all, that is what culminated in the denigration not only of 
the wine but of the festival itself. 
 The first identifiable factor is that, for several reasons, the mutual benefit produced 
by the collectivity became marginal, to the extent that it was rarely desired. The 
younger generation probably could not fully appreciate the fun offered by the festival 
in the same manner as the elders. For instance, very close to the village, a techno disco 
strongly calls to a more noisy and exuberant entertainment. The young people there-
fore seem to have thought that their time was better invested and expended in those 
places than in such Patron Festivals. At the same time, new meeting places such as 
clubs and resorts offer wider and more captivating opportunities for adventure, dia-
logue and interaction. Naturally, without much mutual benefit to be derived, it was 
difficult to maintain the language of cooperation and even more difficult to rebuild it. 
 Another factor which appears to be somewhat related to the first, but is itself more 
profound, is the equitable allocation of desirable mutual benefits. It is evident that 
such festivals produce a higher benefit in recreation for the elderly, but the question is 
who invests the time and resources needed for its success. Of course, it is the younger 
ones. Furthermore, we must also mention the case of small families which appears to 
have been accorded little attention. They consume less than they contribute, whereas 
larger families contribute less than they consume. Of course, these biases that affect 
equity in the distribution and allocation of benefits are inadvertently affecting and 
                                                   
7 In The Evolution of Cooperation, (1984) and The Complexity of Cooperation. Agent-based Model of Competition and 
Collaboration, (1997) Axelrod makes the success of cooperative language depend on the linear applica-
tion of a TIT FOR TAT strategy. Gauthier (1986) and (1997) holds a similar view. However, to make 
their models applicable, both authors take recourse to formal outside restrictions that render the mo-
dels insensitive to the actual conflicts of interests. 
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modifying the expectations of different groups and members of the collectivity. At a 
point, as would be expected, some eventually reason that it is not worth their while to 
continue with the language of cooperation. 
 A last important factor concerns those who carefully compute the value of their 
contribution in terms of real market conditions. After weighing this, they decide to re-
place it with a less costly contribution. Hence, these people enjoy a reasonable wine 
brought by others to the festival, but deep down carry a healthy smile of self-
fulfilment about their smart attitude. As virtually all the villagers are somehow smart, 
sooner or later, one after the other, they start succumbing to the same temptation of 
making their own cost-benefit analysis in the same market terms. This factor in a way 
also conspires against the language of cooperation, as villagers end up, individually, 
applying the same destroying and divisive strategy, instead of using a common strategy 
which tends to strengthen the language of cooperation. 
 These characteristic elements that conspire against the creation of cooperative 
communication could help us to establish which factors are capable of favouring the 
formation and development of the language of cooperation. These are: 
i there must be a general expectation of efficiency as it relates to the genera-
tion and management of common-pool resources; 
ii there must also be a general expectation of promoting a society based on the 
use of joint strategies which may be useful in reaching the highest collective 
dividends; 
iii common goods and services as well as benefits which are generated through 
these joint efforts or strategies should be equitably allocated; 
iv the use of individual strategies which appear fraudulent to society’s joint 
strategy should be eliminated. 
 
 Conditions (iii) and (iv) tend to receive their most important enforcement from 
normative values legally based. Although for such norms to fulfil satisfactorily their 
corrective mission, it would be necessary from the outset to resolve certain not always 
trivial problems. As a matter of fact, it will be necessary to consider what constitutes 
an equitable allocation or distribution under many different social circumstances and 
when it could be categorically stated that an individual approach or strategy consti-
tutes a fraudulent intent against the joint strategy. From this point of view, the 
strength of (iii) and (iv) cannot come from a positive normative point of view that 
only supports its strength by the power of sanctions, but, conversely, from a system of 
regulations oriented and tailored towards the attainment of equitable solutions and di-
rected at the stimulation of joint strategies8. Regarding the production of social bene-
fits, perhaps a body of norms with a strong and solid system of sanctions could be 
enough. But if the intention and aspiration is to construct and develop a language of 
cooperation, positive regulations must be made considered as means to transmit un-
equivocal normative values. 
                                                   
8 See Barragán 1989 for a broader analysis of this topic. 
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 Conditions (i) and (ii) are closely related to social practice. On the one hand, expec-
tations are usually derived from collective experience, but on the other, they also come 
from the reflections made by the group about such experiences. Within the frame-
work of social practice, solving a problem implies not just the material activities that 
make the solution possible, but the intellectual rationalization of the problem and the 
chosen solution. In the process of tackling problems as well as in the development of 
actions and the moral deliberation towards solving it, the system of social expectations 
is bound to undergo transformations. However, once a solution is arrived at, new ex-
pectations emerge which modify the whole preexisting system. It is for this reason 
that expectations cannot be considered as purely static, nor as simply transitory, but as 
definitely evolutionary. This is all the more so as they are built on the basis of preced-
ing expectations which have matured in the process of social practice and the conse-
quent reflections. 
6 Regulatory frameworks for the language of cooperation 
As already discussed, conditions i), ii), iii), and iv) constitute a set that may very well 
serve as the best framework for the regulation of the language of cooperation. As 
much as regulations could be analysed, it is important to note that they cannot have a 
universal nature, since their content is strongly linked to the conditions prevailing in 
each specific social group at a certain point in the time. This means that they can only 
be considered as a general framework that might serve to orient the sense of trans-
formation, but not to establish the hard rules that govern or lead them. 
 Considering the case of our village, according to the memory of the older people 
the organization of the festival, at least initially, was informed by expectations that 
completely satisfied conditions i) and ii). Thus, all the old people hoped that the provi-
sion of public goods and benefits were efficiently managed and considered such activi-
ties as related to a joint enterprise. On the basis of such expectations, they patterned 
their behaviour, which implied arriving punctually in order to finish up the various ac-
tivities and assignments, such as decorative tasks, associated with participation in the 
festival. Driven principally by those expectations, they all committed themselves to 
preparing, in the best possible way, the meals to be consumed, and endeavoured to 
contribute wine of the best quality. 
 Everything seemed to be alright and if we believed in the spontaneous evolution of 
expectations, joint strategies and the language of cooperation, will emerge and get suc-
cess in a natural way; but things happened in a very different form. Many explanations 
could be given as to why a group that naturally spoke the language of cooperation 
without even being confronted with problems of syntax, left it off, until it finally dis-
appeared. Undoubtedly, the hardest responsibility could be attributed to conditions iii) 
and iv) which were not present to normatively support the expectations. But there are 
also some people who suggest other explanations, such as those based on the so-
called negative consequences of the transition from community to society. However, 
none of these explanations can, on their own, account for such complex phenomena 
as replacing a language with another. 
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 If we consider what happened in the village, the thesis which could be developed is 
that linearly cumulative character of achievements in matters of social language them-
selves shows an inherent weakness, since the active exercise of a language of coopera-
tion where conditions i) and ii) are completely enforced can inadvertently end up in a 
language of non-cooperation. The same behaviour can be observed in stages of in-
verse conditions, as it was in the genesis of a common language in the post-war era in 
Europe. In fact, few stages can be identified where conditions i) and ii) were more 
lacking than in Europe after the Second World War. Especially the condition of using 
joint strategies to manage collective affairs seemed unthinkable – for instance, as un-
thinkable as in the case of the relationship between France and Germany, who had 
maintained a tradition of antagonism in the just ended bellicose drama. However, only 
a few years passed before both conditions were present in the European Treaty on 
Coal and Steel, signed in April 1951.What appears most significant and can be ob-
served here is that conditions iii) and iv) were established, tending to reinforce norma-
tively the strategies developed according to i) and ii). 
 In both cases, the village and the European Union seem to have demonstrated that 
the conditions which make possible a language of cooperation are not produced and 
developed in a mechanical and linear manner. Rather, they are a complex product of 
practice and the use of strategies within each social group, tackling problems of pro-
duction and distribution of social benefit. 
 If we go back to the example of our village, we can see better how these four con-
ditions work, and the relations among them. The first thing to see is that the four 
conditions are interdependent and the absence of any one of them produces direct ef-
fect on the others. Second, all of them are historical and therefore provisional, having 
to be permanently updated, in view of the evolution undergone by the collectivity and 
their ethical marks of reference. 
 For instance, if expectations of efficient management (however efficiency might be 
defined) are absent, conditions ii), iii) and iv) do not make sense. This would be the 
case if the villagers did not accord importance to how good the festival was. Likewise, 
if expectations of dealing with problems through the use of joint strategies did not ex-
ist, iii) and iv) would not be enough to keep the language alive. This whould be the 
case that led to the result of a better wine, but did not produce the restoration of the 
language of cooperation. Finally, if iii) and iv) are absent, i) and ii) will not be long be-
fore they disappear. This is the stage that followed that unfortunate night. 
 The second interesting aspect is related to the content of each condition, which in 
the process of change needs to be permanently updated to keep the language alive. In 
the example of the village, it was hoped that the whole paraphernalia of the festival 
could be found useful to produce fun, in the manner considered to be social enter-
tainment by the village standards. Naturally, in the course of time and the modifica-
tion of internal and external social conditions, the content of the expectations experi-
enced changes. In spite of nostalgic opinions, for the young a good discotheque with 
powerful loudspeakers and dazzling laser light seemed to be more useful in producing 
fun than a festival in honour of a Patron Saint. No matter how rules and sanctions 
were established, it gave the impression that new generations had perhaps assumed 
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more enthusiastically other forms of collective interests which by their estimation 
could more relevantly satisfy their present preferences. This makes clear that the defi-
nition of what might be called efficient is not of an unequivocal nature. Rather, it en-
tails the resolution of conflicts among diverse antagonistic conceptions. Likewise, 
given the narrow association between conditions i) and ii), in many cases two joint 
strategies, both pursuing efficient resolutions, are in conflict9 
 If this point is analysed at a level beyond the village, it could be seen that sometime 
in the course of human history collective strategies were sought for granting a good 
life, where ‘good life’ is understood as a peaceful death. Fundamentally, this con-
formed to the fact that a great part of the lives of people were spent awaiting eventual 
death. But today, medical and health care has greatly increased the lifespan. Collective 
strategies are therefore directed at giving a good standard of living in a very different 
sense as in former days. As a matter of fact, today it may not really be fair to strongly 
sanction an individual’s behaviour that tends not to participate in collective strategies 
towards the improvement of the standard of living, in a sense as in the former days. 
 Regarding the content of condition iii), the controversies about what is equitable 
and in what manner it may become effective are well-known issues in the field of legal 
and political philosophy. As there are great differences in individual circumstances, it 
is also much debated how to tackle these problems and in what circumstances they 
can still be useful in solving general problems in an impartial manner. Here, the idea is 
that what may be more suitable to some circumstances may not be reasonable for oth-
ers. These difficulties are heightened by virtue of the natural evolution suffered by ex-
pectations about the management and distribution of public goods, discussed earlier. 
With regard to the content of condition iv), the behavioural patterns considered as 
fraudulent in relation to the joint strategies tend to create some perplexing results. 
This is due to the fact that in some cases it is easy to characterize such behaviour, but 
in other instances, the line of demarcation between what can be qualified as fraud and 
what may be deemed merely the optimal protection of individual interest is hard to 
draw. 
7 Conclusions 
One of the most disturbing problems, and indeed quite difficult to resolve, is the need 
to harmonize individual rationality with that of the collectivity. While the rules of in-
dividual rationality indicate ways of maximizing utility without any restriction, the col-
lective point of view tilts towards the limitation of individual maximization in order to 
reach better social profits. 
 Where a tension exists between these two approaches to rationality, and the solu-
tion favours individual rationality without restrictions, a perceptible effect is immedi-
ately produced. This is the diminution of efficiency and of the quality in the over-all 
process of social production. This normally has a major devastating effect on collec-
tive well-being and is often regarded as the only, or the main, cause of society’ prob-
                                                   
9 The difficulties in integrating individual utility functions to a collective utility function are analyzed in 
Scalon 1991, Griffin 1991, and Barragán 1991. See also Griffin et al. 1993 and Binmore 1994 y 1998 
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lems. Hence, collective efforts are directed to resolve it. However, there are a number 
of more hidden side-effects. They are deeper and more permanent in character, and 
get entrenched in a substantive manner into the fabric of social existence, ending up as 
part of the moral language. While the first effect, which may be called manifest, affects 
the accruement of social benefits, the second one projects itself in a negative way and 
is highly erosive on the trustworthiness and credibility of the rules of language. This 
constitutes the central backbone of any collective existence. 
The correction of the first effect can be carried out in a successful manner through 
the right regulations which by means of sanctions can diminish the benefits derivable 
from non-restricted individual maximization. These sets of sanctions can also produce 
messages of normative worth towards the preference for restricted maximization. 
However, such rather diffusive d messages o not have influence on the collective lan-
guage in an appreciable manner. 
 To correct the second effect of non-restricted individual maximization, the process 
is slower and more complex. In the first place, it is necessary to keep an update on the 
types of relations that exist among individual preferences and the collective goal, 
which allows social objectives to have a reflection on individual utility. In the second 
place, it is necessary consistently to stimulate joint strategies which are relevant for 
collective life. This serves not only the purpose of producing higher dividends from 
the joint strategies, but as an enforcement of the social fabric. The main mechanism 
for reaching this goal is to develop impartial procedures for the allocation of social 
goods and services, and the concern about equitable ingredients which can be useful 
in the resolution of conflicts arising from divergent preferences. The mechanism can 
be regarded complete only when it can eliminate the instinctive attitude that from time 
to time arises, to defraud the common good or to indulge in conducts which disregard 
accepted agreements. 
 As could be seen, the process of constructing and reinforcing the language of co-
operation is a task that includes a dense plot of strategies. It also aims at putting in 
place a culture of a coherent collective will, with a relevant ethics. This task may be 
considered too complex and minimalist, but it is important to recall that it is the only 
efficient mechanism to return the village to its real festivity, much more than merely a 
place where good wine is consumed. Still more important, it is necessary to take into 
consideration that without being able to put the village back in festivity, the good wine 
will remain good for only a short while. 
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